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ABSTRACT
An important political and social phenomena discussed in several
countries, like India and Brazil, is the use of WhatsApp to spread
false or misleading content. However, little is known about the
information dissemination process in WhatsApp groups. Attention
affects the dissemination of information inWhatsApp groups, deter-
mining what topics or subjects are more attractive to participants
of a group. In this paper, we characterize and analyze how attention
propagates among the participants of a WhatsApp group. An atten-
tion cascade begins when a user asserts a topic in a message to the
group, which could include written text, photos, or links to articles
online. Others then propagate the information by responding to it.
We analyzed attention cascades in more than 1.7 million messages
posted in 120 groups over one year. Our analysis focused on the
structural and temporal evolution of attention cascades as well as
on the behavior of users that participate in them. We found specific
characteristics in cascades associated with groups that discuss po-
litical subjects and false information. For instance, we observe that
cascades with false information tend to be deeper, reach more users,
and last longer in political groups than in non-political groups.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Online social networks; • Information sys-
tems→ Chat.
KEYWORDS
WhatsApp; Cascades; Information Diffusion; Misinformation; So-
cial Computing
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1 INTRODUCTION
Global mobile messenger apps, such as WhatsApp, WeChat, Signal,
Telegram, and Facebook-Messenger, are popular all over the world.
WhatsApp, in particular, with more than 1.5 billion users [11], has
an expressive penetration in many countries like South Africa, In-
dia, Brazil, and Great Britain. Messenger apps are an important
medium by which individuals communicate, share news and in-
formation, access services and do business and politics. With end-
to-end encryption added to every conversation, WhatsApp sets
the bar for the privacy of digital communications worldwide. As
a consequence, in many countries, WhatsApp has been used by
political parties and religious activists to send messages and dis-
tribute news. The combination of encrypted messages and group
messaging has proved to be a valuable tool for mobilizing political
support and disseminating political ideas [21]. There is growing ev-
idence of unprecedented disinformation and fake news campaigns
in WhatsApp. In India, false rumors and fake news intended to
inflame sectarian tensions have gone viral on WhatsApp, leading
to lynching mobs and death of dozens of people [16]. Misleading
messages with fake news and photos containing disinformation
have been used to influence real-world behavior in the Brazilian
elections in 2018 [3].
A key component of the WhatsApp architecture is group chats,
which allow group messaging. Groups are unstructured spaces
where participants can share messages, photos, and videos with up
to 256 people at once. Much of the political action in WhatsApp
takes place in private groups and through direct messaging, which
are impossible to analyze due to the encryption protocol. However,
there is a large number of groups that are often publicized in well-
known websites. These groups are open to new participants. After
joining a group, a participant can post messages and receive the
messages that circulate in the group. Unstructured conversations
are the most usual form of conversation in a group chat.
Differently, from Facebook and Twitter, WhatsApp groups do
not have many features that have been pointed out as responsible
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for the dissemination of false information [19]. WhatsApp does
not have ads, promoted tweets, News Feed or timeline, which are
controlled by algorithms. In a group chat, anybody can propose
a discussion or start a new discussion in response to a piece of
content or join an existing discussion at any time and any depth.
There is no algorithm or human curator moderating discussions
in a WhatsApp group. In such a domain, a natural question that
arises is: What are the ingredients of the WhatsApp architecture
that makes it a weaponizable social media platform to distribute
misinformation? The goal of this paper is to take a first step towards
understanding information diffusion in WhatsApp groups. Our
work is an essential step in order to increase knowledge about
misinformation dissemination in messenger apps.
The approach we use to understand information spreading in
a WhatsApp group is a combination of two concepts: information
cascade and attention. WhatsApp allows a participant to explicitly
mention a message she intends to reply or refer to, by using the
reply function. The reply function in WhatsApp creates a sequence
of interrelated messages, which can be tracked and viewed as a
cascade of interrelated messages. Every time a participant “replies”
to a message, all other participants are notified by the message
that appears on the screen. A reply has the effect of re-gaining the
attention for a specific piece of information.
In a chaotic environment of aWhatsApp group chat, participants
are sometimes swamped by messages, which characterizes a typical
information overload situation, that competes for the cognitive
resources of the participants. Herbert Simon [10] was the one who
first theorized about information overload, proposing the concept
of economy of attention. “A wealth of information creates a poverty
of attention” said Simon [26]. Attention cascades can be viewed as
a structure that represents the process of information creation and
consumption, which models new patterns of collective attention.
They capture the connections fostered among group participants,
their comments and their reactions in the group discussion setting.
We want to increase our understanding of information dissemina-
tion processes that underly the dynamics of a group discussion.
Our initial research questions are the following:
• How different are attention cascades in political and non-
political groups on WhatsApp?
• What is the impact of false information on the characteristics
of attention cascades?
To illuminate the behavior of attention cascades, we study the
dissemination processes of cascades in political and non-political
groups as well as cascades with previously reported false informa-
tion and with unclassified information. We show that the attention
cascades are markedly different in their time evolution and struc-
ture. More broadly, by characterizing the attention cascades of
different types of groups, we can better understand the information
spreading process in group discussions and explore the contextual
factors driving their differences.
In this paper, we present a large-scale study of attention cascades
in WhatsApp groups. Attention cascades can help to understand
the process of information dissemination in WhatsApp groups.
With an in-depth analysis of a large number of messages of two
groups, political and non-political, each containing verified false
information and unclassified information, we demonstrate that the
structural and temporal characteristics of the two classes of cascades
are different. We show that attention cascades in WhatsApp groups
reflect real-world events that capture public attention. We also
demonstrate that political cascades last longer than non-political
ones. We show that cascades with false information in political
groups are deeper, broader and reach more users than the same
type of cascades in non-political groups.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first re-
view related work. Next, we discuss the concept of attention cascade
that drives our study and describes each step of our methodology.
We present our results for each research question posed, and then
discuss our main conclusions and directions for future work.
2 RELATEDWORK
Characterizing cascades structure and growth on online social net-
works is a key task to understand their dynamics. Many studies
have analyzed cascades formed on networks like Facebook and
Twitter. In [13], authors analyzed large cascades of reshared photos
on Facebook, more specifically one cascade of a reshared American
President Barack Obama’s photo posted on his page following his
reelection victory, which in 2013 it had had over 4.4M likes, and
another photo posted by a common Norwegian Facebook user (Pet-
ter Kverneng), which got one million likes on his humorous post.
This paper shows that these two large cascades spread around the
world in 24 hours and it points out that studying information cas-
cades is important to understand how information is disseminated
on today’s very well-connected online environment. On the other
hand, analyzing Twitter’s cascades, the authors of [25] analyzed
the cascades from the point of view of users. This paper measures
how Twitter users observe the retweets on their own timelines and
how is their engagement with retweet cascades in counterpoint
with non-retweeted content. Nevertheless, we need to understand
cascades’ properties on emerging online communication platforms
like WhatsApp (which has millions of users organized in groups) to
better understand the phenomenon of the quick information spread
and its impact on users decisions and actions.
Recently, the paper [8] shows how some diffusion protocols af-
fect 98 large information cascades of photo, video, or link reshares
on Facebook. Authors identify four classes of protocols character-
ized by the individual effort for user participates in a cascade and
by the social cost of user stays out. The proposed classes, transient
copy protocol, persistent copy protocol, nomination protocol, and vol-
unteer protocol, may used to understand the cascade growth and
structure. This paper indicates that as individual effort increase the
information dissemination decreases and as higher the social costs
users wait and observe more the group before making a decision
or do any action.
The cascades can be viewed as complex dynamic objects. Thus,
identifying their recurrence and predicting their growth are not
trivial tasks. In [6], authors present a framework to address cascade
prediction problems, which observe the nature of initial reshares as
well as some characteristics of the post, such as caption, language,
and content. Moreover, authors of [7] analyze cascades bursts and
show how their recurrence would occur over time. Predicting cas-
cades growth, evolution, and recurrence could be useful to mitigate
the spread of rumors [14] and of misinformation in general, espe-
cially in the political context, which has received much attention
lately.
Some studies analyzed attention on online platforms. Ciampaglia
et al. [10] analyze Wikipedia network traffic to measure the atten-
tion span and their spikes through time. They found that collective
attention is associated with the law of supply and demand for goods,
in this case, information. Moreover, the authors show that the cre-
ation of newWikipedia articles is associated with shifts of collective
attention. Wu et al. [28] studies the collective attention towards
news story from the political news webiste digg.com. The authors
analyze how the group attention shifts considering the novelty of
the news and the process of fade with time as they spread among
people.
Regarding WhatsApp, there are few studies analyzing data ex-
tracted from groups. The majority of works explore the WhatsApp
effects on education activities. For instance, Cetinkaya [5] inspect
the impact of WhatsApp usage on school performance and Bouhnik
et al. [4] analyze how students and teachers interact using What-
sApp. Other works compare WhatsApp with other applications.
Church et al. [9] analyzes the difference of between WhatsApp and
SMS messaging and in Rosler et al. [24], authors present a system-
atical analysis of security characteristics of WhatsApp and of two
other messaging applications. These studies use qualitative method-
ologies and data related to (but not directly from) WhatsApp to
perform the study. However, few works actually characterize What-
sApp usage using its data. Recently, Garimella et al. [15] proposes a
data collection methodology and perform a statistical exploration to
allow researchers to understand how public WhatsApp groups data
can be collected and analyzed. Rosenfeld et al. [23] analyze 6 mil-
lion encrypted messages from over 100 users to build demographic
prediction models that use activity data but not the content of these
messages. In [22], authors collectedWhatsAppmessages to monitor
critical events during the Ghana 2016 presidential elections.
This paper greatly builds on top of prior study [27], where the
authors analyzed the diffusion of verified true and false news stories
distributed on Twitter. They classified news as true or false using in-
formation from six independent fact-checking organizations. They
found that falsehood diffused farther, deeper, and more broadly
than the truth in all categories of information, especially for false
political news. They also found that false news was more novel
than true news and false stories inspired fear, disgust, and surprise
in replies, whereas true stories inspired anticipation, sadness, joy,
and trust.
In our work, we also adjust the methodology proposed in [27]
on WhatsApp to analyze cascades properties and user relationships
of political and non-political groups. We also analyze and compare
cascades with and without identifiable falsehood using the informa-
tion on Brazilian fact-checking websites. Nevertheless, we extend
the work [27] by applying the methodology on WhatsApp groups
that are entirely different online environments when we compare
to Twitter or Facebook. Finally, we exploit an attention perspective
in our analyses, which brings a somewhat different view of the
problem of misinformation dissemination.
3 ATTENTION CASCADES IN WHATSAPP
WhatsApp enables one-to-one communication through private
chats as well as one-to-many and many-to-many communication
through groups, allowing users to send textual and media (image,
video, audio) messages. Compared to other online social networking
applications (e.g., Facebook, Twitter), WhatsApp may be considered
an unsophisticated platform as information is shared through a very
loosely structured interface. Shared content is shown in temporal
order, with each message accompanied by the posting time and, in
case of groups, its origin (identification or telephone of the user
who posted it). Yet, WhatsApp is a major communication platform
in various countries of the world, offering an increasingly popu-
lar vehicle for information dissemination and social mobilization
during important events [21].
One important feature of WhatsApp is reply, which allows a
user to explicitly mention a message she intends to reply or refer
to, bringing it forward in a conversation thread. This kind of inter-
action among users mentioning, replying or sharing each other’s
messages is common in other online social networks (e.g., reply
and retweet in Twitter, share and post on Facebook). However, in
WhatsApp this feature plays a key role in facilitating navigation
through the sequence of messages, allowing one to keep track of
different ongoing conversation threads. This is particularly impor-
tant in the case of WhatsApp groups, where different subsets of the
participating users may engage in different, possibly weakly related
(or even unrelated) conversations simultaneously. Thus it becomes
hard to keep track of each conversation thread, losing attention
and ultimately diverting.
Our goal in this paper is to study the information dissemina-
tion process in WhatsApp groups, focusing mainly on how user
attention, a key channel for such process, is characterized in such
unstructured, yet increasingly popular environment. To that end,
we use the concept of cascades [27] as a structural representation of
how users’ attention is dedicated to different conversation threads
within a WhatsApp group. We emphasize that conversations in
WhatsApp have the distinguishing characteristic of not being influ-
enced or driven by any algorithm as in other social networks (e.g.,
newsfeed in the Facebook, content recommendation, etc.). They
depend solely on the active participation of users of the group, as
messages posted by others catch their attention.
More specifically, an attention cascade begins when a user makes
an assertion about a topic in a message to the group. This message
is the root of the cascade. Other users join and establish a conver-
sation thread by explicitly replying to the root message or to other
messages that replied to it. We say that the root or subsequent
messages in the cascade caught the attention of a group member,
motivating her to interact. Thus, we focus on messages that were
explicitly linked by the reply feature1. We consider the specific
use of the reply feature as a signal that the user’s attention was
caught by the message she is replying to and that the cascade is
a (semi-)structured representation modeling emergent patterns of
collective attention. As in any real conversation of a group of people,
attention may drift to other (possibly weakly related) topics as the
1Users may not necessarily use the reply feature to respond to a previous message.
However identifying such implicit links would require processing the content of the
messages, which is outside the present scope.
conversation goes on. Note however that in an explicit reply, the
message that is being replied to is shown to everyone, just before
the reply itself, serving as a means to “re-gain” or keep (part of)
the original attention that motivated the user to participate in the
cascade. Thus, the root message triggers the initial attention of
some users, and the conversation is kept alive among a subset of
participating users (which may change over time) as they continue
replying to successive messages.
We also note that, unlike prior uses of the cascade model to
understand the propagation of a particular piece of content [13, 25],
we here use it to represent the participation (thus attention) of
multiple users in an explicitly defined conversation thread, despite
other messages and conversations that might be simultaneously
happening in the same group. Thus, we refer to such structural rep-
resentation of how collective attention is dedicated to a particular
conversation thread within a WhatsApp group as attention cascade.
4 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe our methodology to gather data and
characterize attention cascades in WhatsApp groups. We analyze
cascades concerning three dimensions, namely, structural and tem-
poral properties as well as user participation. The first two capture
the main patterns describing how collective attention is dedicated
to a conversation thread and how it evolves. The latter captures how
individuals participate in such process, interacting with each other
via replies. Given the extensive use of WhatsApp for discussions
related to politics and other social movements [21], we collected
data from groups oriented towards political and non-political topics.
We define the topic of a cascade as the topic of the group it belongs
to, and we analyze political and non-political cascades separately.
Similarly, we also analyze cascades with identified false information
separately from the rest.
In the following, we start by describing our methodology to
collect WhatsApp data (Section 4.1), and present how we identify
and build cascades from such data (Section 4.2). We discuss our
group and cascade labelling method (Section 4.3) and present the
attributes used in our characterization (Section 4.4).
4.1 Data Collection
We collected a WhatsApp dataset consisting of all messages posted
in 120 Brazilian WhatsApp groups from October 16th 2017 to No-
vember 6th 2018. Despite offering private chats by default, What-
sApp allows group administrators to share invites to join such
groups on blogs, web pages, and other online platforms. Such fea-
ture effectively turns the access to the group and the content shared
in it public since anyone who has the invite can choose to join the
group, receiving all the messages posted after that.
We focus on groups whose access is publicly available. To find
invites to such groups online, we leveraged the fact that all links
shared by group administrators have the term chat.whatsapp.com
as part of their URLs. Thus, we used Selenium scripts on Google
Search website to search for web pages containing this term and
located in Brazil (according to Google).We parsed all pages returned
as a result of the search, extracting the URLs to WhatsApp groups.
The monitoring and data collection process of each group re-
quires an actual device and valid SIM card to join the group. Thus
we were restricted to join a limited number of WhatsApp groups
by the available memory in our devices. We randomly selected and
joined 120 groups to monitor. These groups cover different topics
which can be further categorized into political oriented subjects
or not, as will be discussed in Section 4.3. We then used the same
process described in [15] to collect data from those groups, pre-
serving user anonymity and complying with WhatsApp privacy
policies. Specifically, we extracted the WhatsApp messages from
our monitoring devices (smartphones) using scripts provided by
the authors2, replacing each unique telephone number by a random
unique ID. Throughout the paper, we refer to such a unique ID by
the term user3.
In total, our dataset consists of 1,751,054 messages posted by
30,760 users engaged in the 120 WhatsApp as mentioned earlier
groups 4.
4.2 Attention Cascade Identification
Recall that an attention cascade is composed by a tree of messages,
which are pairwise connected by the reply feature, posted by one
or more users. We identify cascades on WhatsApp by taking the
following approach. We model each group as a directed acyclic
graph where each node is a message (text or media content) posted
in the group and there is a direct edge from message A to message
B if message B is a reply to messageA5. Each connected component
of such a graph, which by definition is a tree, is identified as a
cascade. Note that we chose not to impose any time constraint on
the cascade identification because we consider the use of a reply
as strong evidence of the connection between messages. Thus, all
cascade leaves are messages that did not receive any reply (in our
dataset). Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciência da Computação - UFMG 1
MESSAGE 2
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Figure 1: Example of a cascade on WhatsApp.
Figure 1 illustrates how we identify cascades from messages
posted in a WhatsApp group. Figure 1 (left) shows a sequence of 7
messages. The cascade starts with “MESSAGE 2”, the root, which
was posted at time 15:35. At time 15:38, another user replied to that
2https://github.com/gvrkiran/whatsapp-public-groups
3We are not able to identify multiple telephone numbers belonging to the same person.
4Readers can contact the first author to request the anonymized dataset used in this
work. We would be pleased to provide it.
5Thus, message B was necessarily posted after message A.
message by posting “MESSAGE 3”, which was then followed by
another reply, “MESSAGE 5”. At time 15:50, user “You” replied the
root message by posting “MESSAGE 7”. Note that “MESSAGE 4”
and “MESSAGE 6” posted during this time interval do not belong to
the cascade as they are not explicit replies to any previous message
in the cascade. Moreover, “MESSAGE 1” does not belong to the cas-
cade either, since the message was posted before the root message.
Moreover, since it did not receive any reply, it does not belong to
any cascade. Finally, note that “MESSAGE 7” is a reply made by the
same user who posted “MESSAGE 2”, thus it is a self-reply. By such
an example, it becomes clear that there might be multiple on-going
cascades simultaneously in the same group.
4.3 Classifying Groups and Cascades
As mentioned, we analyze cascades of different topics, notably
political and non-political topics, as well as cascades containing
false information separately, aiming at identifying attributes that
distinguish them. In this section, we discuss how we label each
cascade according to such categorization.
WhatsApp groups are identified by names that reflect the gen-
eral topic that the discussions in the group should cover. Examples
of group names in our dataset (translated to English) are Brazil-
ian news, Friendship without borders and Right wing vs. Left wing.
Our data collection span several periods of significant social mo-
bilization in Brazil. For instance, the 2018 Brazilian general elec-
tion, during which WhatsApp was reportedly a significant vehicle
of political debates6. Thus, we chose to classify groups into two
categories: political oriented and non-political. To that end, we
manually labeled the groups according to their names. For instance,
group names that refer to specific candidates or political debates
were labeled as political groups, whereas all others were labeled as
non-political. Out of the three examples above, the first two illus-
trate non-political groups, whereas the last one (Right wing vs. Left
wing) is clearly politically oriented. Our labeling effort identified
78 political and 42 non-political groups in our dataset.
We refer to an attention cascade in a political group as a politi-
cal cascade. Similarly, cascades in non-political groups are labeled
as non-political. Such definition is a simple cascade categoriza-
tion since the specific topic(s) discussed in a cascade may diverge
from the group’s meant subject. Nevertheless, we argue that, in
general, inheriting the group label is a reasonable approximation,
and we leave for the future a more specific content-based cascade
categorization.
Orthogonally, we also distinguish cascades containing report-
edly false information (e.g., rumor) or, more generally speaking,
falsehood, from the others. To that end, we relied on previously
identified fake news reported by six Brazilian fact-checking web-
sites (Aos Fatos, Agência Lupa, Comprova, Boatos.org, Checagem
Truco, and Fato ou Fake) 7. We first collected all news identified as
fake by those six Brazilian fact-checking websites, totalling 3,072
fake news fact-checks. Next, we filtered fake news in text, that is,
6Another example was a national truck drivers strike which greatly affected the
country with the shutdown of highways in most states which caused unavailability of
food and medicine for two weeks in late May 2018.
7https://aosfatos.org/, https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/lupa/, https://projetocomprova.
com.br/,https://www.boatos.org/,https://apublica.org/checagem/,https://g1.globo.
com/fato-ou-fake/
we removed fact-checks that analyzed fake content only in media
formats (audio, video or image). In total, we selected 862 fake news
texts.
We then turned to the messages in our identified cascades, focus-
ing on textual content and URLs shared. The latter often refers to
news webpages. Thus, we extracted the texts from those URLs using
the newspaper8 Python library, which is specialized to retrieve the
textual content of news portals and websites. We discarded all URLs
for which the library was not able to recover the text (returned
NULL).
In total, we identified 337,861 pieces of text on the cascades
(327,530 textual messages and 10,331 texts from URLs). For the sake
of readability, we refer to all of them as merely text messages.
In order to identify text messages with falsehood, we first pro-
cessed all fake news and text messages by removing stopwords and
performing lemmatization using the Natural Language Toolkit [2].
We then modeled each piece of content (fake news and text mes-
sage) as a vector of size n, where n is the number of distinct lemmas
identified in all text messages and fake news. Each position in the
vector contains the weight of the corresponding lemma, defined as
the term frequency (i.e., the number of times that the term appeared
in the corresponding text).
We compared each text message against each fake news by com-
puting the cosine similarity [18] between their vector representa-
tions. Specifically, given a text message (vector)m and fake news
(vector) f , we computed their textual similarity as:
similarity(m, f ) = m · f∥m∥ ∥ f ∥ =
∑n
i=1mi fi√∑n
i=1m
2
i
√∑n
i=1 f
2
i
(1)
wheremi and fi are the weights in text vectorsm and f . The cosine
similarity returns a value between 0 and 1. The closer the value to
1, the stronger the similarity between the vectors.
In order to reduce noise, we focused on text pairs with similarity
above 0.5. We manually inspected each such text pair and identified
a total of 677 out of 2271 messages whose textual content referred
to fake news reported by Brazilian fact-checking websites. We label
any cascade containing at least one of suchmessages as cascade with
falsehood9. We refer to all other cascades as unclassified. Note that
we cannot guarantee the absence of falsehood in the unclassified
cascades as we only analyzed fake news in text format, and we are
restricted by the available fake news in such format reported by fact-
checking websites. Nevertheless, we assume that the most popular
fake fake news disseminated as textual content were identified and
listed by Brazilian fact-checking services.
In total, we identified 666 cascades with falsehood (49 non-
political and 617 political cascades) and 149,528 unclassified ones
(52,689 non-political and 96,839 political cascades).
8https://pypi.org/project/newspaper/
9Although we do not impose restrictions on the depth of such message, we note that
in the vast majority of the cases (93%), the root message of such cascades carried false
information.
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A replied to D
D replied to A
Figure 2: Six motifs considered for analysis. Each node is a
user and an edge (i, j) represents that a user i replied a user j
in a given cascade.
4.4 Cascade Attributes
We characterize attention cascades concerning several attributes
which can be grouped into three main dimensions: structural prop-
erties, temporal properties, and user participation. The structural
properties consist of the number of nodes, depth, maximum breadth,
and structural virality. The number of nodes corresponds to the
total number of messages in the cascade. The depth of a particu-
lar messagem in a cascade is the number of edges from the root
message tom (i.e., number of replies fromm back to the root). The
depth of a cascade is then defined as the maximum depth reached
by a message in the cascade. The breadth of a cascade is defined
according to a certain depth and corresponds to the number of mes-
sages in that particular depth of the cascade. Thus, the maximum
breadth of a cascade is defined based on the breadth at all depth
levels in the cascade. The structural virality of a cascade is defined
as the average distance between all pairs of nodes [17]. The higher
the structural virality value, the stronger the indication that, on
average, the messages are distant of each other, thus suggesting
viral diffusion of content in that cascade [17].
The main temporal attribute analyzed is the cascade duration,
defined as the time interval between the last message belonging
to the cascade and its root. We also characterize the temporal evo-
lution of each cascade by analyzing its structural properties over
time. When analyzing structural and temporal attributes that are in
function of another attribute, we normalize their values in order to
compare cascades with different values ranges. For example, when
we analyze depth over time, we averaged (and measured standard
error) at every depth considering the maximum depth of the cas-
cade. Thus 50% depth means the depth at the middle of any cascade.
Therefore, we can analyze the average number of minutes it took
to reach a certain percentage depth in a cascade and compare with
others.
Regarding the third dimension, user participation, we character-
ize each cascade in terms of the number of unique users participat-
ing in the cascade as well as the patterns of social communication
established by them. For the latter, we first build a user-level repre-
sentation of each cascade, that is, we build a directed graph whose
vertices are users and an edge between vertice X and vertice Y is
added if user X replied to user Y in the given cascade. We identify
patterns of social communication occurring between users in such
representation using motifs. To that end, we borrow from [29],
where the authors proposed network motifs as a tool to analyze pat-
terns of information propagation in social networks. The authors
proposed four types of motifs (i.e., long chain, ping pong, loop, and
star), we here extend the definition by analyzing six motifs, which
are shown in Figure 2. Specifically, we propose the self-loop motif
and divide the star motif into two other motifs by differentiating it
according to its edge orientation (incoming star and outgoing star).
Moreover, we choose to rename long chain to chain and ping pong
to dyadic.
We identify motifs in cascades testing if a cascade graph is iso-
morphic to a motif template. We define templates for the motifs
in Figure 2 as follows. Self-loop and dyadic motifs are considered
templates, as the total number of nodes is fixed (one and two, re-
spectively). For the remaining motifs, we generate templates with
the number of nodes ranging from 2 (chain) or 3 (loop, outgoing
star, incoming star) up to n, where n is the maximum number of
unique users in any cascade analyzed. To detect graph isomor-
phism, we used the implementation of the VF2 algorithm proposed
by Cordella et al. [12] available in the networkx Python library. The
VF2 algorithm identifies both graph and subgraph isomorphism.
Our analysis considers the presence of a motif in a given cascade if
the cascade is a graph (or subgraph) isomorphic to the correspond-
ing template.
5 CASCADE CHARACTERIZATION
In order to understand the characteristics of the attention cascades
as well as the hidden structures existing in the interaction between
participants of a group, we adopt a three-dimension approach to
characterize attention cascades. To that end, we look at the struc-
tural and temporal characteristics of the cascades and the different
communication forms that participants of a cascade interact with
each other. In the following, we present the analysis and discussion
of the findings in each dimension.
5.1 Overall cascade analysis
In this section, we look at the number of cascades identified in our
dataset of messages. To do so, and rather than viewing the set of
all cascades, we segment the cascades into two classes, namely:
political and non-political. For each class, we separate the cascades
into two sub-classes: cascades with verified false information and
unclassified cascades, that may have both true and false information,
but it was not verified.
Figure 3 shows the total number of cascades in the dataset col-
lected fromWhatsApp groups during the period from October 2017
to November 2018. As it is evident from Figure 3, there are two
peaks of cascades in political groups. These peaks shown in the
leftmost graph are associated with key events of the electoral cam-
paign in Brazil. One peak occurred when the presidential candidate,
Jair Bolsonaro, was stabbed in the stomach during a campaign rally
at the beginning of September. The other event was the day of
the first round of voting, at the beginning of October. It is worth
noting that the peak of the number of political cascades with false
information is also associated with the date of the first round of vot-
ing, that was widely publicized by the media [3]. The non-political
cascades with falsehood remained stable during the election period,
as exhibited in the rightmost graph of Figure 3. In the leftmost
graph, the peak for non-political cascades occurred by the end of
May, coinciding with the truckers’ strike that halted Brazil, with
protesters blocking traffic on hundreds of highways [20]. These two
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Figure 3: Total cascades over time.
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Figure 4: Depth, maximum breadth, structural virality, and total messages.
graphs clearly show that attention cascades in WhatsApp groups
reflect real-world events that capture the public attention.
We also analyzed temporal relationships among different cas-
cades of each group [1]. We found that in 99.2% of the cases there is
no temporal overlap (i.e., one cascade finishes before others start).
Therefore, our dataset shows that most of the time only one thread
of discussion dominates the attention of the group.
5.2 Structural Characteristics
In this section, we focus on the structural characteristics of the
cascades, that are defined in section 4.4. Figure 4 shows the CCDF
of the empirical distribution of the main structural characteristics
of the two classes of cascades, political and non-political and the
sub-classes, represented by cascades with false information and un-
classified cascades. The upper row shows the comparison between
political (dotted) and non-political (regular) groups. The lower row
shows the comparison between ‘unclassified’ (blue) and ‘with false-
hood’ (red), besides the previous segmentation between political
and non-political, totaling four lines of distribution.
A natural question concerning the structure of attention cascades
in different WhatsApp groups is whether they exhibit a similar
structural profile. When analyzing the cascades on political and
non-political groups (upper row) in Figure 4, we observe that the
graphs show similar curves for both classes, with small differences
in the probability of the maximum values for the two classes. We
observe that non-political cascades are deeper and broader than
political cascades. Moreover, despite the structural virality of po-
litical and non-political cascades are very similar, when we look
at the graph that shows the structural virality of the sub-classes
of cascades (lower row), we note that the virality of cascades with
false information in political groups is more significant than the
virality in a non-political group. Recall that higher virality sug-
gests viral diffusion, which maybe interpreted as a sign that false
information in political groups spread farther than in non-political
groups. Finally, the total number of messages attribute calls our
attention since the number of messages in political discussions
exceeds the number in non-political discussions, indicating that
political subjects stimulate more interaction among participants.
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Figure 5: Breadth vs. depth and unique users vs. depth of cascades from political and non-political WhatsApp groups.
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Figure 6: Cascade duration and unique users.
Now we analyze the cascade attributes as a function of depth.
We observe in Figure 5 that cascades of political groups have on
average more users than cascades of non-political groups after 35%
of the maximum depth. The cascades in political groups are on
average wider than non-political ones after the half of the maxi-
mum depth, indicating that cascades of political groups finish with
more parallel interactions (branches) than the non-political ones.
Regarding misinformation comparison, we note that cascades with
falsehood in political groups reach on average more users than the
other types of cascades for higher depth. Note that cascades with
falsehood of non-political groups have an unstable behavior. The
cascades with falsehood of political groups reach on average more
people at every depth as the cascades were deepened.
5.3 Temporal Characteristics
We now turn our focus to the length of time of the attention cas-
cades. The first column of Figure 6 displays the CCDF of the cascade
duration. The top graph of the this column shows that political
cascades last longer than non-political ones. A possible explanation
is that political cascades stir more debate among the participants
of the group. The graph at the bottom of the first column of Fig-
ure 6 shows the CCDF of the duration of unclassified cascades and
cascades with false information. As we can see from the graph, in
both types of groups, political and non-political, the presence of
false information reduces the duration of the cascades. We conjec-
ture that when false information or fake news is identified in the
cascade, the participants of the group start losing interest in the
discussion and terminate the cascade.
Regarding temporal cascade attributes as a function of depth and
unique users, we observe on the topmost left graph of Figure 7 that
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Figure 7: Depth over time and unique users over time of cascades from political and non-political WhatsApp groups.
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Figure 8: User motifs.
cascades in political groups take two times longer than cascades in
non-political groups to reach their maximum depth. The topmost
right graph indicates that cascades in political groups take consid-
erable more time to reach 90% of unique users than non-political
groups. Moreover, both graphs are that attention allocation in a
WhatsApp group clearly depends on the nature of the content that
starts the cascade. One possible explanation is that political discus-
sions spur hot debates that last longer. In the lower part of Figure 7,
we also note that political cascades with falsehood take longer to
reach the maximum depth. However, non-political cascades with
falsehood take less time to reach the maximum depth. Although
we have not explored the content in messages, we conjecture that
political fake news has a significant impact on group discussion
and generate more debate than non-political fake news, as shown
in the leftmost graph of Figure 7.
5.4 User Participation in Cascades
In this section, we focus on the following question: how partici-
pants of a cascade interact with the other participants? We analyze
the relative frequency of the six motifs that represent the most com-
mon patterns of social communication among participants of the
cascades. Figure 8 shows that the most common pattern of commu-
nication among participants of a cascade is chain, for both political
and non-political groups. Chain is the most popular motif in the
two classes of groups. The percentage of chain is more than half of
the total motifs identified in the cascades. It is interesting to observe
that the fraction of self-loops in political groups is two times greater
than the percentage of self-loops in non-political groups. Regarding
misinformation analysis, the rightmost graph of Figure 8 displays
that cascades with falsehood of political groups have a higher per-
centage of chain and self-loops than corresponding non-political
cascades. One possible explanation for the higher percentage of
self-loops is that in political discussions a participant might want
to emphasize or defend her position or idea and makes explicit
reference to her previous message in the cascade.
Regarding the total number of users participating in cascades,
we note on the second column of Figure 6 that cascades in non-
political groups reach more users than in political groups. This
characteristic indicates that discussions in non-political groups
draw more attention than the ones on political groups probably
because of their content. Moreover, cascades with falsehood on
political groups reach more users than cascades with falsehood on
non-political groups.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we used an extensive set of messages to characterize
attention cascades in WhatsApp groups from three distinct perspec-
tives: structural, temporal and interaction patterns. We developed
a data collection methodology and model each group as a directed
acyclic graph, where each connected component is identified as a
cascade. In addition to providing a new way of looking at informa-
tion dissemination in small groups through the concept of attention,
our study has unveiled several interesting findings, regarding polit-
ical groups and misinformation. These findings include differences
in the structural and temporal characteristics of political groups
when compared to non-political groups. We show that cascades
with false information in political groups are deeper, wider and
reach more users than cascades with falsehood in non-political
groups. We demonstrate that political cascades last longer than
non-political ones. We also show that attention cascades in What-
sApp groups reflect real-world events that capture public attention.
Our current and futurework is focused on leveragingmany of the
findings and conclusions presented in this paper along with several
dimensions. First, we are looking into using information about
content to understand their impact on the structure and temporal
characteristics of attention cascades. Questions we want to answer
in the future include the following: What kind of content would
extend the duration of attention cascades? What is an adequate
metric for quantifying attention in a group chat?What is the impact
of hate content on the characteristics of attention cascades? Finally,
we want to construct tools to generate synthetic attention cascades
to model different types of group chats.
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